This is what I was talking about in one of my previous posts. An expert engineering panel with the American Society of Civil Engineers has released a report “detailing several recommendations for overcoming the deficiencies in the city’s hurricane protection system and instituting real change in its governance, management and engineering.”
Their conclusions are apparently straightforward, and reflect, I believe, much of the notion I wanted to communicate: the complex network of politicians, engineers, and other stakeholders compromised the decision-making which should have ensured the safety and welfare of the citizens of New Orleans.
Many of their recommendations were aimed at simplifying this network, or at the least, reducing the forces acting on decision-making relevant to hurricane protection.
Some of their specific recommendations include:
-Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities by having all responsible agencies reevaluate their policies and practices to ensure that protection of public safety, health and welfare is the top priority for infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding. Also, encourage Congress to establish and fund a mechanism for nation-wide “Levee Safety and Rehabilitation,” as is done for major dams.
-Quantify and periodically update the assessment of risk. This approach should be extended to all areas in the United States that are vulnerable to major losses from hurricanes and flooding.
-Determine the level of acceptable risk in the community through quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding.
-Correct the system’s deficiencies by establishing mechanisms to incorporate changing information, making the levees survivable if overtopped, strengthening the I-walls and levees, and upgrading the pumping stations.
-Assign to a single individual, a licensed engineer, the responsibility of managing critical hurricane and flood protection systems such as the one in the New Orleans.
-Implement more effective mechanisms for coordination and cooperation (for example, those responsible for maintenance of the system must collaborate with system designers and must upgrade their inspection, repair and operations to ensure that the system is hurricane and flood-ready).
-Upgrade engineering design procedures to place greater emphasis on safety.
-Engage independent experts in high-level reviews of all critical life safety structures, including hurricane and flood protection systems.
From these, the two that resonate most with me include upgrading engineering design procedures to place greater emphasis on safety, and quantifying and periodically updating the assessment of risk. While these are probably intended for infrastructure at a large scale, I believe it is important to address these to more small-community-scale applications as well.
For example, as the assessment of risk is updated, maybe building codes for residential and other structures could be changed to encourage the use of more reinforced concrete design to protect against extreme winds and storm surges.
I think it may be quite difficult to assign the responsibility of managing critical hurricane and flood protection systems to a single individual, but this may be done in the spirit of reducing the size of the network of politicians, engineers, and other stakeholders. I think one additional qualifying recommendation must be added. That an independent body be responsible for maintaining these systems, the head of which should be a licensed professional engineer. I think this might help provide the autonomy necessary to give the mandate of public protection paramount importance, while ascribing responsibility to a single individual.
In my view, these recommendations are an important component of any plan to protect the public from natural and imposed risks, and they should be broadly applied to other classes of infrastructure as well.